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A
Anticompetitive behaviour by firms
with market power
Introduction
The ﬁrst two chapters consider cases where there is a single ﬁrm that can be
identiﬁed as dominant in the market. Each was engaging in identiﬁable
business practices that rivals considered to be an abuse of economic power.
The two dominant ﬁrms in question could claim that they achieved their
dominance by success in the competitive process of giving customers what
they wanted. The core economic issue was whether the practices in question
went beyond consumer satisfaction. Did they entrench dominance and stiﬂe
the competition that would be necessary for consumers to continue to be
given what they wanted at a reasonable price?
Both cases were investigated by the European Commission under Article 82
of the EU Treaty which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position. Both cases
were also appealed unsuccessfully to the CFI. Article 82 is not speciﬁc as to what
is an abuse but it provides a number of examples, including ‘unfair purchase or
selling prices’ and price discrimination that leaves trading parties at a ‘compe-
titive disadvantage’. If a ﬁrm is found to have broken the prohibition, it can be
ﬁned up to 10 per cent of its turnover and be required to comply with remedies
that eliminate the identiﬁed problem. Article 82 has almost exclusively been
applied to business practices that exclude rivals and not to directly exploitative
high prices. This can be justiﬁed up to a point in the context of dominant ﬁrms
that have achieved their position by virtue of offering consumers what they
want. However, it is less persuasive if dominance has been achieved by virtue of
government regulation or structural barriers to entry.1
In the 2001 case known as Michelin II, the tyre manufacturer was found to
have abused its dominance by using a complex system of rebates in the French
1 See Lyons (2007).
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market for heavy-vehicle tyres. Michelin, which had a market share of 55–60
per cent, was ﬁned €20 million and required to change the scheme. Motta
takes issue with the lack of economic analysis used by both the EC and the CFI
to reach this verdict. The Commission did not provide a coherent theory of
exclusionary effects andmade no serious attempt to identify consumer harm –
it merely considered the scheme capable of harm. Motta acknowledges that
some elements of the rebate schemes might have had an equivalent effect to
tying or exclusivity contracts, but there were also identiﬁable incentives for
service support. Furthermore, quantity discounts can be pro-competitive by
encouraging dealers to ﬁght for marginal customers. Motta outlines the
theoretical framework necessary to formulate a theory of foreclosure due to
various types of rebate and so points the way to a better economic analysis. He
notes that Michelin’s market share and prices were falling at the time of the
case and concludes that it was fairly implausible to expect the rebate schemes
to exclude multinational rivals such as Continental, Goodyear, Pirelli,
Bridgestone and Sumitomo/Dunlop.
Microsoft has been involved in a number of competition cases on both sides
of the Atlantic. In 2004, the EC found that Microsoft had abused its dominant
position by deliberately restricting the interoperability between Windows PCs
and non-Microsoft workgroup servers and bundling Windows Media Player
with itsWindows operating system. It had amarket share exceeding 90 per cent
in PC operating systems and its share of server operating systems rapidly rose
from 20 per cent in the late 1990s to over 60 per cent in 2001. It was ﬁned €497
million and a further €280 million for delaying compliance with a required
remedy, which was to provide technical information on the Windows interface
that would facilitate interoperability.2 Kühn and Van Reenen concentrate on
the interoperability issue. Their analysis supports the Commission’s case,
though the EC’s economic argument could have been improved. The authors
demonstrate howMicrosoft had both the ability (through restricting interoper-
ability) and the incentive to foreclose rivals in server operating systems. The
incentive came both in extracting surplus from consumers and in preserving
its PC operating system monopoly. This could be achieved in the long term
by preventing users from being able to switch to server-based operating
systems and so bypassing the need for a sophisticated PC operating system.
An important issue was the extent to which these competition issues should
outweigh Microsoft’s intellectual property rights. The authors argue that
2 This is a large sum of money that would build several new hospitals, but from another perspective it is less
than a half a per cent of Microsoft’s market capitalisation.
24 Cases in European Competition Policy: The Economic Analysis
C:/ITOOLS/WMS/CUP/377825/WORKINGFOLDER/LYO/9780521886048PTL01.3D 25 [23–26] 10.6.2009 4:01PM
even if Microsoft’s incentive to invest in developing better software may be
compromised by the remedy, the incentive for rivals will be much enhanced.
Finally, they brieﬂy review the Windows Media Player part of the case and
criticise the Commission’s chosen remedy.
The next two chapters address rather different issues under different
legislation. A common feature is that both have four leading ﬁrms with
broadly similar market shares. In each case, these ﬁrms appeared to be
competing reasonably vigorously with each other, but there were concerns
expressed about some of their practices. These raised a Goldilocks problem:
were these practices leading to prices that were too high, too low or about
right?3 The ﬁrst case investigates the boundary between full regulation and
competition policy. The case followed an appeal by lightly regulated ﬁrms over
a price cap on mobile phone termination charges. The second is based on a
distinctively UK element of competition policy which allows for the investiga-
tion and remedy of markets which do not have a single dominant ﬁrm yet are
apparently not working well.4
Mobile networks charge the originating network for providing the service
of delivering a call from a ﬁxed line to their subscribers. This is known as a
termination charge. Since most customers have only one mobile phone, each
network holds a monopoly on call delivery to its customers. It must therefore
be expected to set inefﬁciently high termination charges, which will be passed
on to ﬁxed-line customers. This makes it very attractive to sign up mobile
subscribers and leads to strong competition for them, so creating some off-
setting beneﬁts (e.g. in the form of ‘free’ handsets). The monopoly delivery is
sometimes called a bottleneck and the competition for customers makes it a
‘competitive bottleneck’. Mobile-to-mobile calls are different in that mobile
networks negotiate reciprocal charges. With similar-sized networks, these
charges will more or less cancel out and the parties argued that this changes
the economics. It may even become more proﬁtable to set inefﬁciently low
termination charges in order to soften competition for subscribers. The
Competition Commission was unconvinced by this argument and determined
that negotiated termination charges were too high and would have to be
3 Goldilocks is a fairy-tale character who stumbled across the house of the three bears (Daddy, Mummy
and Baby) while they were out and found that the three bowls of porridge they had left on the table were
either too hot, too cold or just right.
4 Since 2003, the European Commission also has powers to investigate markets, though it does not have the
powers of remedy that are available to the UK Competition Commission. UK powers under the Fair
Trading Act (1973) have since been revised in part 4 of the Enterprise Act (2002). This major revision
included a move from a public-interest test to an explicit competition test. EC powers derive from Article
17 of Regulation 1/2003 EC.
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reduced. Armstrong and Wright show how a simple model which takes
account of the essential characteristics of the market can help to reveal
where the truth lies. They conclude that the Competition Commission’s
ﬁndings and the implications of their own modelling are broadly consistent,
though the model does point out some inconsistencies in the reasoning.
The top four UK grocery chains in 1999 commanded 84 per cent of the sales
of large supermarkets and nearly two-thirds of all grocery sales. The sector
accounted for 40 per cent of all retail spending, so it had a very high proﬁle and
the leading ﬁrms were investigated in 2000 as a ‘complex monopoly’ (i.e. an
oligopoly).5 Concerns related to both pricing practices and buyer power. The
former included below-cost selling and price ﬂexing (geographic price dis-
crimination). One ﬁnding was that price ﬂexing was against the public interest
because consumers paid more when their local supermarket faced weaker
competition. However, Dobson draws on economic theory to observe that this
is unlikely to harm consumers on average because, if there is national pricing,
consumers will be charged a price that reﬂects average market power, so some
consumers will get lower prices just as others paymore. Furthermore, national
pricingmay facilitate coordinated effects. The case also raises issues relating to
the effect of buyer power on the dynamics of retail competition, the possibly
predatory effect of below-cost selling and the difﬁculty of designing effective
remedies even when a problem is identiﬁed. For example, drawing on evi-
dence from elsewhere in Europe, remedies to make prices more cost reﬂective
might soften competition and so do more harm than good.
5 Since this chapter was written, the Competition Commission has published another report into the wider
groceries market.
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